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ALTERNATIVE COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
FOR MANAGING TRANSBOUNDARY
AIR RESOURCES ALONG THE BORDER
C. RICHARD BATH*
INTRODUCTION
In a discussion of the alternative cooperative arrangements which
could be taken to manage transboundary air resources along the
United States-Mexico border, we would do well to note the word of
caution towards environmental control sounded by Professor Chayes
several years ago: "[I]nstitutional design for international environmental affairs depends on the basic conception of the problem." 1
How is the problem of air resources management perceived and
conceived along the border? What needs to be understood at the
outset is that the different perceptions and conceptions regarding air
resources will define and delimit the nature of any institutional
response to air resources regulation. This paper will explore some of
the conceptions and perceptions which may influence the various
actors along the border, as well as discuss the institutional alternatives
which might be implemented. Three different levels of analysis may
be used: 1) the global ecosystemic analytical level or approach; 2) the
international or bi-national analytical approach; and 3) the national
and subnational analytical approach.
THE GLOBAL ECOSYSTEMIC APPROACH
The global ecosystemic approach is rooted in systems theory and
the outlook of the ecologist. 2 Ecologists tend to view the environment
in holistic terms, as Barry Commoner phrased his First Law of
Ecology, "everything is connected to everything else." 3 The science
of ecology stresses the interrelationship and interdependence of all
phenomena in the ecosystem. At the international level those who
have an ecosystemic perspective are likely to talk of "Spaceship
Earth" and the need for approaching global environmental problems
as part of one unified system. 4 These analysts are likely to downgrade
*Department of Political Science, University of Texas at El Paso.
1. Chayes, InternationalInstitutions for the Environment, in LAW, INSTITUTIONS AND
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 2 (J. Hargrove ed. 1972).
2. See Major, HistoricalDevelopment of the Ecosystem Concept, in THE ECOSYSTEM IN
NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 9 (G. Dyne ed. 1969).
3. B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE (1971).
4. Among analysts in this vein are R. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET (1972); H. &
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the role of the nation-state in formulation of policy and to stress the
need for approaching any given environmental problem from a global
perspective. 5 Concomitantly, they usually recommend the formation
of functional global institutions that resemble world governments, or
ones that have strong supranational authority which will permit them
to attack and eventually solve any environmental problem.
Prior to the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in
1972, some naively thought that what would emerge would be a
strong supranational agency which could adequately cope with global
environmental problems. 6 Others were more pessimistic and correctly
foresaw the creation of the weaker United Nations Environmental
Programme (UNEP), with its primary function being information
gathering and support for research and training of technical personnel. Professor Chayes wisely noted prior to Stockholm that drastic
action such as the creation of a regulatory agency with supranational
powers required a heightened sense of impending doom and crisis
which was clearly lacking throughout the world. 7 In the intervening
years since Stockholm there does not appear to have been a major
change in attitude on the part of national governments towards global
environmental regulation. Indeed, because of the worldwide energy
crisis of 1973-74 and the increasing confrontation between the North
and South over resource utilization, concern for the environment as a
priority global problem has been reduced.
However, the international political context of the environment,
along with other global problems such as food, population, energy,
water, distribution of resources, uses of the sea, and nuclear proliferation, has resulted in new patterns of international diplomacy which
should be noted. Subnational, transnational, and supranational actors,
while by no means replacing the nation-state as the primary actor,
most certainly have increased in both overall importance as well as
sheer amount of activity in global politics. 8 Both intergovernmental
and nongovernmental organizations play more prominent roles, and
M. SPROUT, TOWARDS A POLITICS OF THE PLANET EARTH (1971); and B. WARD & T.
DUBOS, ONLY ONE EARTH (1972).
5. Coplin, for example, talks about a world policy process model in which other actors are
equal to nation-states over specific issues. See W. COPLIN, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1972).
6. While no one specifically thought that a world superagency would result, there existed a
general ambience that a different type of international politics was right around the comer as a
result of commonly perceived problems of the globe. See, e.g., B. COMMONER, supra note 3;
B. WARD & T. DUBOS, supra note 4; and various articles in WORLD ECO-CRISIS (D. Kay &
E. Skolnikoff eds. 1972).
7. Chayes, supra note 1, at 2-4.
8. See, e.g., R. MANSBACH, Y. FERGUSON & D. LAMPERT, THE WEB OF WORLD
POLITICS: NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM (1976).
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frequently bring to the attention of nation-states more pressing issues.
Indeed, it was mainly non-state actors that provided the original and
chief impetus for a discussion of environmental problems along the
border.9 Most certainly the nation-state remains paramount in global
politics, but the new patterns have changed the framework in which
the nation-state operates.
What are the possibilities of a truly global ecosystemic approach
being used along the U.S.-Mexico border? Should not the commonly
shared border contribute to an equally shared perception of the need
for an ecosystemic regulatory agency for border environmental
problems? Frankly, the answer to both questions is a flat, nol There is
almost no perception by public officials on either side of the border of
the need for regulation of air resources. While many official and
nonofficial persons may be somewhat concerned with the problem of
air pollution, neither side, at any governmental level, appears ready
to submit to a superagency the necessary regulatory powers to
allocate or control resources of any type. Along the border air
pollution as a problem ranks far behind others such as unemployment,
health care, industrialization, lack of development, and a host of
others. We can, therefore, eliminate immediately and without further
ado any ecosystemic approach to management of air resources along
the border or the establishment of a strong supranational agency to
solve pollution problems.
THE INTERNATIONAL AND/OR BI-NATIONAL APPROACH 10
An international analytical approach to environmental problems
could be at several different levels. International organizational
response as in the case of UNEP or the involvement of the Pan
American Health Office (PAHO) could be discussed. Indeed, it has
been primarily through the efforts of PAHO and the Bi-National
U.S.-Mexico Border Health Association that any effort towards mutual
governmental resolution of environmental problems have taken place.
The chief function of these agencies is to serve as catalysts and
9. University professors, international lawyers, and governmental officials acting in a private
capacity have written about border environmental problems in two books of readings:
POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES (A. Utton ed. 1973) and AIR POLLUTION ALONG THE UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDER (H. Applegate & C. Bath eds.
1974). The latter book is a collection of papers given at the First Bi-National Symposium on Air
Pollution Along the United States-Mexico Border in El Paso, Sept., 1973.
10. There is some confusion over the use of the word "international." Normally to a political
scientist, the term international would not seem appropriate as applied to the IJC and the
IBWC; rather, bi-national describes the actual decision-making apparatus. However, if agencies
are classified under the international Organization Immunity Act as international, then
apparently international lawyers so classify them. It must be recognized that the function of the
agencies remain bi-national.
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conveyors to involve the two nation-states, although both obviously
play subordinate roles in terms of information gathering and dissemination and as a forum for the meeting of people concerned with a
common problem. The possibility of organizations of the United
Nations system going beyond these limited functions does not appear
very great over the short-term future. Regional agencies such as those
in Europe could also serve as models, but these organizations are
probably more appropriate to those concerned with managment of
water basins. 1 Since there are only two governments involved along
the U.S.-Mexico border, perhaps the most logical model to follow
would be that presented by similar organizations elsewhere which
function in resolving bi-national boundary disputes. In this regard the
joint effort of Canada and the United States to develop mutual
programs for reduction of water pollution may prove to be the best
example in view of the obvious similarities between the two border
regions. Let us briefly explore the joint effort between Canada and
U.S.12

The International Joint Commission (IJC) was established by formal
treaty in 1909. The major purpose for the IJC was to create an agency
capable of resolving several thorny boundary problems resulting from
shared rivers and lakes. But Article IX of the treaty stated that the
waters on either side should not be polluted to the injury of the
opposing side. The Treaty neither defines pollution nor injury and no
enforcement procedures were established. Indeed, it is unlikely that
the writers of the Treaty meant this particular article to be very
significant. Nonetheless, under the procedures established by the
Treaty, both governments submit letters to the IJC (these letters are
by tradition identical) to investigate a given problem. Since 1909
there have been at least ten such letters. By far the most important
agreement was that reached for cleaning up the Great Lakes in 1972.
Brief mention should be made of the types of procedures developed
11. See, e.g., Utton, International Water Quality Law, 13 NAT. RES. J. 282 (1973); see also
Sepulveda, Implications for the Future: Design of Viable International Institutions, 15 NAT.
RES. J. 215 (1975).
12. For sources consulted for environmental regulation along the U.S.-Canada border, see
Dworsky, The Management of InternationalBoundary Waters of Canada and the United States:
A Comparative Study, 15 NAT. RES. J. 223 (1975); Dworsky, Francis & Sweezy, Management of
the International Great Lakes, 14 NAT. RES. J. 103 (1974); Morse, Model Water Resources
Program for International Boundaries of the United States and Canada, 12 NAT. RES. J. 388
(1972); McCaffrey, Trans-Boundary Pollution Injuries: JurisdictionalConsiderations in Private
Litigation Between Canada and the United States, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 191 (1973); Tempe,
InternationalAir Pollution-UnitedStates and Canada-AJoint Approach, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 138
(1968); Bilder, Controlling Great Lakes Pollution: A Study in United States-Canadian Environmental Cooperation, in LAW, INSTITUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 1, at 294; D. PIPER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE GREAT LAKES (1967).
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by the IJC to resolve mutual problems. The IJC is composed of three
commissioners from each country, and, until recently, these commissioners have been expert technicians rather than politicians. Recently
political considerations have played more important roles, especially
as the perceptions of pollution increased. The Commission has
developed a strong tradition of independence and impartiality as a
result of focusing on the technical nature of problems. The staff has
also remained small since technical boards are picked to investigate
whatever matter is under consideration. The reports submitted to the
IJC by these boards have been noted for their excellence and
comprehensive treatment of technical problems. As a result of these
procedures, the IJC gathers information and data as an independent
and self-sufficient agency. At the same time, it should be stressed that
the IJC has no enforcement powers and both national governments
are free to ignore the recommendations of the IJC.
After his lengthy review of the IJC, Professor Bilder concludes that
the following valuable lessons can be learned: 13
1. Large-scale environmental problems, such as that of Great
Lakes pollution, are extremely difficult to solve.
2. Many environmental problems are largely localized, with
their causes and effects occurring principally within a single
nation.
3. Governments will be reluctant to subject their flexibility
and freedom of action regarding environmental policies to
international restraints.
4. Since even concerned countries can be expected to be reluctant to accept international environmental restraints, it
follows that the price of including relatively unconcerned
countries in an environmental arrangement may be one so
watered down as to have little content; the commitments
will be reduced to the "lowest common denominator" of the
least interested party.
5. The possibilities for successful international cooperation with
respect to particular environmental problems may be enhanced by a formal acknowledgement of the international
character of such problems and of the propriety of their
international treatment.
6. In attempting to deal with international environmental problems, governments may often prefer loose cooperative
arrangements to techniques of formal legal prohibitions.7. If formal treaty arrangements and institutions are established for environmental cooperation, there are strong arguments for making these arrangements relatively flexible and
13. Bilder, supra note 12, at 347-50; see also Dworsky, supra note 12, at 226-27.
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open-ended, with a capacity to expand and adapt as problems and needs clarify and the parties 'gain confidence in
their cooperative activities.

8. U.S.-Canadian experience demonstrates that international
environmental cooperation can yield useful dividends at
relatively low costs and with limited political risks.
9. Some of these functions potentially involved in international
environmental cooperation such as monitoring, surveillance,
and the presentation of technical objectives and options,
seem best performed by institutions acting in a relatively
expert and political capacity.
10. Even limited patterns of international environmental
cooperation may produce possibly useful secondary effects.
One is struck by the persistent thread of these conclusions: lowest
common denominator of least concerned party, difficulty of solving
problems, governmental reluctance to accept international restraints
on national actions, limited political risks, and so forth. I have argued
elsewhere that environmental regulation along the border will have to
be at the lowest possible level of interaction and the results are hardly
likely to please many environmentalists. 14 There is no reason to
believe that currently cooperation will be much beyond the lowest
common denominator at least cost. That conclusion obviously sets
extreme limits on the amount of bi-national interaction to resolve
environmental problems along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Two major difficulties encountered in the successful management
of pollution, the establishment of quality standards and the assessment
of costs to the participants, should be noted in this discussion. In the
case of the U.S.-Canada border, water quality standards for pollution
have been achieved, but the problem of costs of cleaning up the water
has not been solved-mainly because of a reluctance of the U.S. under
the Nixon administration to spend money required under the 1972
agreement. Incidentally, one of the initial positions taken by Canada
was that it should be permitted to pollute up to the levels of the U.S.
before it assumed its share of cleaning up the water. Canada reasoned
that since it had, by far, less population and industry along the Great
Lakes, it was not responsible for most of the pollution and, therefore,
should not pay to clean it up. Brazil took a similar stance at the
Stockholm conference and the entire Third World (of which Mexico is
14. C. Bath, Towards a Model for an Environmental Regulatory Commission Along the
United States-Mexico Border (paper presented to the Second Bi-National Symposium on
Environmental Problems Along the United States-Mexico Border, Nuevo Laredo, March 13,
1975. To be published in the Memoria of the Symposium).
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a part) generally regards pollution as a product of the developed
zone-and one the developed countries should pay to clean up. 15
Both of these problems, quality standards and costs of cleaning up,
are critical to the U.S.-Mexico border since they will reflect different
perceptions in which the management of resources will have to take
place. Quality standards may not present a major difficulty, since both
16
Mexico and the United States have established federal standards.
One should quickly add that El Paso (as well as the rest of the border)
has not been required to comply with these federal quality standards
because of its very international setting. The EPA feels El Paso cannot
comply because of pollution in Ciudad Juarez. It is very doubtful that
Juarez is in compliance with Mexican standards either. The second
problem of costs is directly related to perception of pollution as a
major problem since one can hardly expect significant action if there
is no perception of the problem. This is the crux of the difficulty for
the U.S.-Mexico border: it is highly doubtful that many perceive
pollution as a major problem. On the Mexican side concern with
development, industrialization, and employment are weighed more
heavily and important than pollution. 17 This means that regulation of
pollution is in trouble on two counts: 1) the creation of jobs and the
development of industry and agriculture must take precedence, and
one adds rightfully so, over concern for the environment; and 2) given
limited resources, pollution regulation cannot be granted much
weight in the distribution of these resources. For example, Mexico can
hardly afford the type of air pollution recording devices needed to
measure pollutants and, indeed, the U.S. must provide them. One
must hastily add that the problem of costs is equally important on the
U.S. side of the border. The border is currently one of the most
economically underprivileged regions of the U.S. with unemployment
running higher than in any other area. Since concern with pollution
normally is associated with higher incomes and other middle class
attributes, many living along the border simply do not perceive
15. The conflict between the developed and developing countries over the environment is
best presented in Development and Environment, Report Submitted by a Panel of Experts
Convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, Founex, Switz., June 4-12, 1971, U.N. DOC. GE 71-13738 (reprinted as
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: THE FOUNEX REPORT, INTERNATIONAL
CONCILIATION (1972)); for the Brazilian position, see Castro, Environment and Development: The Case of the Developing Countries, in WORLD ECO-CRISIS, supra note 6 at 237.
16. These air quality standards can be found in AIR POLLUTION ALONG THE UNITED
STATES-MEXICO BORDER, supra note 9, at xv-xxi.
17. The conflict between development and environment is noted by Cuadra, Aspectos
juridicos de la contaminacion atmosferica en el area fronteriza, id. at 120. It should be added
that a conflict between environmental management and development is not preordained.
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pollution as a major problem. 18 Given the lack of concern on both
sides of the border, and the general lack of political clientele,
governmental agencies have not been pressed to include pollution as a
high priority item on their agendas. Indeed, these agencies seldom
feel any public pressure for pollution control because, frankly, no one
is much concerned about pollution.
In using the model of the IJC along the U.S.-Canada border, it is
obvious that there already exists an international agency along the
U.S.-Mexico border which could (and in many respects does) perform
similar functions. This agency is, of course, the International Boundary and Water Commission-US. and Mexico Sections (IBWC).19
Indeed, one analyst has already made an excellent comparison of the
potentialities of the two agencies for expanded environmental control. 20 Smedresman assumes that both the IJC and the IBWC can
perform excellently as agencies for control of the boundary environment. With respect to the IBWC he notes that Article 24 of the 1944
Treaty grants the IBWC powers to initiate and carry out research,
planning, construction, and supervision of water works. Subsequent
agreements have authorized the IBWC to undertake specific projects,
but no broad grant of legal or jurisdictional power similar to that for
the IJC had been given. The lack of jurisdictional power is critical for
the IBWC since, unlike the current status of the IJC, treaty powers
would have to be obtained for regulation of air pollution. A new
treaty would therefore be required.
Smedresman feels that in its day-to-day operation the IBWC
exhibits a high degree of professionalism and efficiency using a
practical and basically apolitical approach. The agency simply
concentrates on the completion of technical tasks. In this professional
and apolitical bent the IBWC appears to conform to the guidelines
established by Bilder for successful management of the environment.
In its fact-finding function, the IBWC has acquired an enormous
amount of information on specific projects, but investigation is limited
to those projects. The IBWC does not have the independent and
self-sufficient investigative powers of the IJC. Broader investigative
powers would be necessary if the IBWC were to manage border air
resources.
18. Attitudes towards the environment and income levels are noted in Trop & Roos, Public
Opinion and the Environment, in THE POLITICS OF ECOSUICIDE 52 (L. Roos ed. 1971).
19. As Smedresman points out, there is a dearth of material on the IBWC, especially in
comparison with the amount of material available on the IJC. See Smedresman, The

International Joint Commission (United States-Canada) and the International Boundary and
Water Commission (United States-Mexico): Potential for Environmental Control Along the
Boundaries, 6 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 499 (1973).
20. Id.
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On the other hand, Smedresman notes that the IBWC has power
that the IJC also could use. The reference procedure employed by the
IJC could result in either the government ignoring or refusing to
comply with the recommendation of the IJC. Under IBWC procedures the decisions reached are binding on both governments unless a
government formally objects within one month-an unlikely occurrence given the close cooperation which exists prior to the actual
decision. This enforcement provision would appear far better for
eventual resolution of environmental problems. Another recommendation for procedures to follow in environmental management is that
both agencies continue the practice of hiring outside experts to
conduct investigations. In the current climate in the U.S. of opposition to government expansion, it would be politically wise not to
advocate an expansion of powers of the IBWC that would also require
a large increase in staff.
The IBWC and the IJC both have long traditions of successful
settlement of disputes, but Smedresman adds that both commissions
have been unable to act effectively when the political spirit was
lacking, as was the case of the IBWC and the Chamizal dispute. 21 He
also notes that when disputes arise as part of judicial proceedings it
becomes very difficult to resolve them. In fact the recommendation is
to take every possible measure to keep disputes from going to judicial
bodies. In this regard, one of the more important roles of the IJC and
IBWC is to cut off possible disputes by providing information which
allows the governments to discuss and negotiate potential problems
before they escalate. In his subsequent discussion of the need for
environmental control by the two agencies, Smedresman buttresses his
argument with the evolving international law which makes a
nation-state responsible for harmful results beyond its border. He cites
the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the Lac Lanoux Arbitration between
France and Spain, and the refutation of the Harmon Doctrine by the
U.S. Supreme Court as evidence of this growing body of international
law.22

He adds that while the IBWC in its everyday operations puts into
effect the rules of international waterways, it has had no contact with
21. Id. at 513. Larman C. Wilson holds that interpretations of the role of the IBWC in the
"power politics approach" are not basically correct; that, in fact, the IBWC has carried out
policy in a generally apolitical vein. See L. Wilson, The Settlement of Boundary Disputes:
Mexico, the United States, and the International Boundary Commission (paper presented to the
International Studies A. Meeting, Toronto, Feb., 1976); for a different perspective, one that
supports the contention that the Chamizal discussions followed the general pattern of relations
between the two countries, a view supported by this writer, see Jessup, El Chamtzal, 67 AM. J.
INT'L L. 423 (1973).
22. Smedresman, supra note 19, at 518-19.
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pollution problems. Furthermore, the IBWC apparently does not
want any contact with air pollution regulation.2 3 Stressing the need
for further cooperation to resolve air pollution problems, Smedresman
24
concludes
The obvious question is whether or not the IBWC, as an
established mechanism for international cooperation involving
boundary questions, is suited for such a role. One side of the
question is the Commission's own position that such problems are
not its concern, as well as preference for leaving problems to
unilateral treatment if possible. On the other side of the question
is the availability of the Commission's pool of engineering talent
and the simple fact that it is an existing organization with a
tradition of impartiality and expertise. If the Commission's
existing powers and jurisdiction are inadequate, they can be
expanded, even if on an ad hoc basis as in the Chamizal dispute.
While treatment of a particular source of pollution is best handled
by the nation in which it originates, the formulation of criteria
and standards, the prosecution of investigations, and the exchange
of information can be meaningfully carried out by the two nations
working together. The IBWC, it is submitted, is well-situated to
take an active role in such work.
This writer, in a reversal of previous criticism of the IBWC as a
potential environmental regulator, now supports the conclusion that
25
the IBWC is "well-situated to take an active role in such work."
There are, needless to say, some fundamental problems that should be
recognized in an expanded role for the IBWC, not the least of which
is a rejection of the IBWC itself of an expanded role for the agency in
environmental matters. This problem could be handled relatively
easily by simply ordering the two bi-national sections to work
together under the spirit of friendship and cooperation endorsed by
the two new Presidents, Jimmy Carter and Jose Lopez Portillo.
Indeed, expanding the role of the IBWC to include environmental
management is the type of symbolic gesture which would be widely
supported by many environmentalists at small expense to both
governments. It is the type of political act-low cost, high symbolic
value-heartily accepted by most politicians. In the atmosphere ol
increased tension likely to build along the border, it also would serve
23. Id. at 526. He quotes a letter from the Executive Officer of the U.S. Section to the effect
that air pollution is not within the existing jurisdiction of the IBWC.
24. Id. at 527.
25. C. Bath, supra note 14. The same conclusion was reached by other commentators at tht
First Bi-National Symposium. See, e.g., Sepulveda, Metodos intergubernamentales viables para Ik
cooperacion en el control y eliminacion de lacontaminacion del aire a lo largo de lafronterc
Mextco-Norteamercana, in AIR POLLUTION ALONG THE UNITED STATES-MEXICC
BORDER, supra note 9, at 131.
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as a cooperative mask for more pressing and urgent problems between
the two countries. A new treaty, of course, would be required and
perhaps it could be tied to resolution of another thorny boundary
question, the extension of the 200-mile economic zone in the Pacific
and Gulf of Mexico.
A second major difficulty is to recognize at the outset the limited
nature of such bi-national cooperation and the political overtones new
functions for the IBWC would have. There can be little doubt that
cooperation for management of transboundary air resources would be
at the lowest possible common denominator-least cost level with
very little impact on actual air pollution regulation. The lessons to be
learned from the IJC noted by Professor Bilder would be especially
appropriate. Another limitation is to know beforehand that other
political relations of great importance will dictate effective cooperation and regulation of environmental problems. The overall nature of
relations between the two countries is particularly important since
the IBWC is an agency within the State Department and the Foreign
Ministry and it tends, therefore, to reflect in its actions the major
critical issues affecting the two countries at any given period. In spite
of the claim that the IBWC is a "neutral" and/or "apolitical" agency,
it still reflects basically the political climate emanating from the
respective foreign offices.26 This means that the role of the IBWC will
be consistently affected by factors other than environmental matters
along the border. For example, the State Department initially
opposed any discussion of air pollution along the border until it felt
that Mexico responded adequately to water pollution problems in the
Gulf of Mexico.2 7 As will be seen below, it is likely that tension will
continue to build along the border and, if this is the case, air pollution
regulation will not be regarded as a high priority goal by either the
28
U.S. or Mexico.
A third, but by no means final, problem to be considered in
assigning the IBWC responsibility for managing air resources, is to
recognize that the IBWC would have very little enforcement power,
especially on the U.S. side of the border. The primary reason is the
nature of federal-state relations. Although there are federal air quality
standards, it must be recognized that the enforcement measures in the
26. Supra note 21.
27. C. Bath, Air Pollution Policy Formulation in the U.S. and Mexico: The El Paso-Juarez
Region (paper presented to the W. Pol. Sci. A. Meeting, Denver, April, 1974).
28. Another factor to be considered in terms of subsequent regulation of air resources are the
recent finds of gas and oil along the northern tier of states in Mexico. Large deposits have been
liscovered in Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamalipaus, all close to the border.
Production would greatly aid the economically depressed border, but it might also lead to
yreater problems with air pollution. See Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 22, 1977.
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U.S. normally are left up to the states. (Mexico does not have this
particular problem of the same extent.) Most of the states, especially
Texas, have left enforcement of air pollution regulation to local and
municipal authorities. One obvious difficulty is that enforcement
patterns are then likely to differ decidedly depending on the state:
California, for example, is normally regarded as a much more
stringent enforcer of environmental controls than Texas. The federal
regulatory agency, the Environmental Protection Agency, also differs
in terms of its regional offices and their primary interests. Region VI
which includes New Mexico and Texas has concentrated almost
exclusively on water pollution and largely ignored air pollution.
The border presents peculiar problems to federal agencies since it
does not represent the normal pattern of legal responsibility. The
EPA has exempted El Paso from compliance because of the international situation. Strange situations exist along the border in terms of
government relationships. For instance, in the development of the
joint air monitoring service in the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez region, the
representative of the Subsecretaria de Mejoramiento del Ambiente, a
federal agency, meets with the air pollution control officer of the El
Paso City/County Health Unit, a local agency with tenuous ties, at
best, to federal agencies. Obviously, normal patterns of bureaucratic
ebbs and flows do not fit well in that type of relationship. One often
gets the impression, in certain cases, that both the State Department
and the Foreign Ministry would prefer that the border disappear and
relations be conducted normally as they are with other countries from
capital city to capital city. Most certainly, an effective management
role for the IBWC on the U.S. side of the border will necessitate
29
some type of federal-state agreement over the extent of its powers.
This conclusion leads us logically to the next section, consideration
of national policy, since in reality it will be the primary responsibility
of the national governments to handle environmental matters within
their respective boundaries.
THE NATIONAL APPROACH
One must recognize, whether it is pleasant or not, that final
jurisdiction over environmental matters will reside with the nation29. Several different approaches have been suggested to handle the complex federal-state
relations for the border. Representative David Finney of Texas has suggested using an interstate
compact as a device to permit coordination. See Finney, Federal Interstate Compact: An
InternationalEconomic Solution to the Border Problem, EL PASO ECON. REV. (special issue,
May 1975). Recently the Mayor's Border Conference, operating under the Economic
Development Act established a commission for border development. Another device which
could be used is Title V of the Regional Development Act which could result in a planning
agency for border development. All of these would be primarily concerned with economic
development, and less with border environmental problems.
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state. Sovereignty is hardly at bay when it comes to air pollution.
Regulation of air pollution as a national policy issue is quite complex
and I would simply like to point out some aspects that appear most
relevant for the border. What is needed is some sort of classification
scheme that will permit some degree of prediction of future events.
Political scientists tend to classify interaction between nation-states
along broad continuums that attempt to place certain types of actions
or behavior on either a conflictual or cooperative scale or mode. 30 On
the conflictual side of the behavior mode one begins with threats,
threats with demonstrations, and passes up the scale to war. Similarly,
on the cooperative side one moves up the scale from simple promises
to full structural and functional integration of the community (the
global ecosystem in the case of the environment). While there is no
assumption that one must pass sequentially either up or down the
scale of the behavioral mode, it appears to this writer that future
relations between the U.S. and Mexico along the border are far more
likely to move up the conflictual side of the behavioral mode than
they are on the cooperative side. It is within the framework of
increasing conflict that management of air resources for the border
must be discussed.
The U.S.-Mexico border now appears, especially after the economic shocks to the Mexican economy in the fall of 1976, to be similar
to a seismic recording station to measure earthquakes, only the border
is apolitical recording station to measure the intensity and frequency
of political shocks between the developed and developing countries.
The border is not only one between the United States and Mexico;
since September it stands as an unmarked border between consuming
nations of the North and the aspiring nations of the South. For many
years the "miracle" of Mexican economic growth disguised major
differences of wealth between the two countries. The peso devaluation and recent economic difficulties have demonstrated the
skewed economic growth which has occurred. For the border region
unemployment and the problem of the illegal alien are but two
manifestations of economic crisis-a crisis that in the short-run can
only become more volatile.
Evidence of increasing tension along the border continues to
mount. The peso devaluation, while showing the economic interdependence of the border economies, also brought forth calls for
economic retaliation and countermeasures against the other side of
the border. Recent events in the El Paso-Juarez region point out how
30. See Price, Behavior Modes: Toward a Thoery of Decision-Makin. 37 J. POL. 417 (1975);
see also R. MANSBACH, Y. FERGUSON & D. LAMPERT, supra note 8.
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tenuous peaceful conditions actually are and how potential outbreaks
of irrationality have become. An attempt to enter the U.S. illegally in
broad daylight across a railroad bridge resulted in the death of a
Mexican citizen in the plain view of citizens of both countries. For
two days groups gathered on the Mexican side demanding some
action against the INS official involved. Chicano groups in El Paso
denounced the Border Patrol for the death. In this atmosphere an
attempt to "run" the Rio Grande by a jeep loaded with 550 pounds of
marijuana produced a moment of jocularity. 3 1 The jeep bogged down
in the middle of the river and the two riders escaped to the Mexican
side. Crowds gathered on both sides of the river, tow trucks from both
sides hooked up the vehicle, and a two-hour tug-of-war took place
with U.S. helicopters hovering overhead with marksmen prepared to
respond to possible snipers. Eventually, the U.S. side brought in a
huge tow truck far outmanning the Mexican truck, the Mexican tow
cable broke, and the U.S. "team" won the battle. While the event was
treated in a comedy tone by the local U.S. mass media-but not by the
Mexican media-it is wise to take note of just how close a true
international confrontation may have been. One wrong act by either
side could have turned a happening into a disaster.
The increased tension has also effected the on-going joint air
monitoring program, the longest-standing cooperative action between
the two countries in terms of air pollution. 32 First, Mexican officials,
for some inexplicable reason, refused permission for trucks from the
City/County Health Unit to enter Mexico to collect the samples from
the recording stations. Collection of samples had alarmed no one in
the five years of the program. Then in apparent retaliation, the Mayor
of El Paso refused to allow the trucks to return to Mexico at all,
ostensibly because they lacked the required insurance to do so.
Subsequently, a joint program for mosquito eradication was endangered, as well as other long-standing cooperative actions in the field of
health. One hopes this tension will not increase, but at the national
level the Rodino bill and the complaints of General Chapman, head of
the INS, of the need for more border patrolmen to stem the
"invasion" from Mexico indicate that the issue will increasingly
concern national decision-makers. 33 Indeed, border patrolmen in the
El Paso area believe they are in a war, and the methods they are
employing are the same as those used against infiltrators in Vietnam.
31. El Paso Times, Feb. 18, 1977.
32. See Davila, Joint Air Monitoring Program Developed in the Cities of Juarez, Chihuahua,
Mexico, El Paso, Texas and Las Cruces, New Mexico, in AIR POLLUTION ALONG THE
UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDER, supra note 9, at 155.
33. Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 17, 1977.
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The AFL-CIO is taking aim at another border problem, the twin
plants operating all along the border. Organized labor established the
goal of eliminating these off-shore plants and if they are successful it
would contribute to hostility along the border. In such an atmosphere,
then, tension between the two countries is likely to escalate. The
short-run conclusion is that increasing conflict between the two
countries is the more likely behavioral pattern.
What will happen to management of air resources in such an
atmosphere? One good possibility is that air pollution would be
ignored, but here is a scenario that could occur and should be treated.
If economic conflict increases, and if the differences between the two
countries become wider, there is a good possibility that Mexico could
resort to international law as a tactic. International law traditionally
is used by the weaker nations, and if Mexico feels increasingly slighted
by the U.S. and a target for discriminatory legislation against its
citizens, then recourse to international law would be a legitimate
weapon with which to counterattack. A case is readily available if
Mexico wants to use it. In 1970-72 the American Smelting and
Refining Co. (ASARCO) plant in El Paso was found responsible for
34
lead poisoning of children residing in areas close to the smelter.
Subsequently, ASARCO paid damages. Officials from the Center for
Disease Control of the U.S. Public Health Service conducted the
study and took blood samples from the children involved.3 5 Environmental engineers in El Paso believed that because of the prevailing
wind patterns there was a good possibility that the heavy metals,
including lead, had been transmitted to Juarez. Accordingly, a wind
tunnel project was built which verified the existing wind pattern into
Juarez. This meant that children in Juarez were probably affected by
lead poisoning. Accordingly, under the guidance of the CDC out of
Atlanta, the Subsecretaria de Mejoramiento del Ambiente conducted
a study of Juarez and took blood samples from different zones in the
city.3 6 In 1974 the data was acquired and the report concluded that
on the basis of the study, more than 8,000 children between the ages
of one and nine had suffered lead poisoning directly attributable to
the smelter.
Obviously, here is a parallel case to the Trail Smelter Arbitration
34. Foss, Environmental Law: Air Quality Litigation in the El Paso-Juarez Area, in
POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES, supra note 9, at 72.
35. See P. Landrigan, Epidemic Lead Absorption Near an Ore Smelter: The Role of Lead in
Dust (mimeographed paper for Center for Disease Control, El Paso, 1973).
36. B. Ordonez, L. Romero & R. Mora, Investigacion epidemologica sobre niveles de plomo
en la poblacion infantil y en el medio ambiente domicilia-Rio de Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, en
relacion con una fundicion de El Paso, Texas (paper presented to U.S.-Mex. Bi-National Border
Health A. Meeting, Los Angeles, April, 1975).
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between Canada and the U.S. but one that involved injury to human
beings rather than cattle. 37 Further legal support for the Mexican
position could be taken from Principle 21 of the Statement of
Principles adopted by the U.N. Conference on the Human Environ38
ment.
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.
In the case of lead poisoning of children in Mexico, it would appear
that the U.S. is in violation of the spirit of Principle 21. It should be
added that under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 a foreigner has
standing in court to sue for damage inflicted by pollution arising in
the United States. We also need to add, however, that recourse to the
courts by Mexico would probably result in a long-festering sort of
litigation similar to El Chamizal. It would also result in a procedure
of judicial arbitration, one decidedly opposed by Smedresman. One
must honestly hope that it could at least result in state and local
agencies responsible for enforcement looking more carefully at their
regulatory role. Litigation is mentioned here only as a likely result if
escalation continues on the conflictual side between the two countries.
A far more useful long-range projection of relations between the
two countries would call for cooperative action in terms of management of air and water resources. One would have to recognize,
naturally, that this cooperation would occur at a very low level of
interaction and may be more rewarding if undertaken primarily by
private individuals and groups working with the tacit, and occasionally active, support of governmental units. Indeed, it may prove most
practical to permit non-state actors such as the U.S.-Mexico Public
Health Association, university professors, private groups, and local
governmental agents to bear the brunt of much of the research and
acquisition of data under the general guidelines established by the
IBWC. The various symposiums conducted, including this one, have
provided some background and collaboration between interested
persons from both sides of the border. Another significant contribution
37. The Trail Smelter Arbitration is discussed by literally everyone concerned with pollution
across boundaries. The most recent treatment is Handl, TerritorialSovereignty and the Problem
of TransnationalPollution, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 50 (1975).
38. U.N. DOC. A/CONF..48/14 (July 1972).
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to long-range cooperation is the recent agreement reached between
border universities for the exchange of information and personnel,
mutual research studies, and the training of the necessary technicians
to conduct environmental investigations. 39 This program would help
to alleviate a major drawback to successful environmental regulation,
the lack of trained personnel. Both federal governments should
provide research funds and other support for this worthwhile project.
One recognizes that this level of interaction is both unexciting for
those who are most concerned about cleaning up the environment,
and unlikely to make thrilling improvements in the border environment. Nonetheless, it would avoid the kind of confrontation that could
destroy any cooperation whatsoever; at the same time, it would
provide the type of information, personnel, and human interaction
which could subsequently be used to actually regulate environmental
matters along the border.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The basic points of this paper may be summarized in the following
recommendations:
1. At this juncture, because of both a worldwide and border
perception that air pollution is not a critical problem, it
appears unlikely that a major governmental effort to regulate air resources will result. While not ignorning the possibility of a change in attitudes (perhaps as a consequence
of a major eco-catastrophe), in the short run the low level
of concern means inter-governmental cooperation will be
at a mimimum level.
2. Thus a superagency or functionally specific international
agency seems improbable for resolving air resources management along the U.S.-Mexico border at this time.
3. Yet participation of federal agencies is indispensable for
any subsequent resolution of air resources problems. While
active roles of national and local agencies are necessary, an
agency which is either international or bi-national is required to handle the problems between the two countries.
4. Such an agency is the on-going International Boundary and
Water Commission. The role of the IBWC should be expanded to include supervisory management over both air
and water pollution with an understanding that other environmental matters might also fall under the jurisdiction
39. The agreement is presented in H. Applegate & C. Bath, Air Pollution Along the United
States-Mexico Border with Emphasis on the El Paso-Ciudad Juarez-Las Cruces Air Shed (paper
presented at First Meeting of U.S.-Mexico Transnational Resources Study Group, San Diego,
Nov. 1976).
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of the Commission. Indeed, a change in title to the International Boundary and Environmental Commission (IBEC)
appears appropriate.
A formal treaty is required for the expanded role of the
IBEC. The formal arrangements agreed upon should be
flexible and open-ended and, at the same time, formal recognition should be given to the truly international character
of environmental problems.
These formal arrangements also should acknowledge that for
the near future cooperation is most likely to be at the lowest
common denominator/least cost level. Nonetheless, every
effort should be made to ensure that the IBEC has broad
investigative powers to perform its fact-finding mission.
Over the near future the IBEC should keep a low profile
and remain as apolitical as possible, especially because of
the likelihood of increased tension in the border region.
International boundaries should not be permitted as an
excuse for other national, state, and local governments to
ignore their own responsibilities, especially on the U.S. side
of the border. The U.S. should recognize the moral and legal
obligation it has to clean up a polluted environment. That
moral and legal obligation should be conveyed to local and
state leaders in terms of their assigned responsibilities under
under the law. It is the general responsibility of the U.S. to
present a model for Third World countries in terms of environmental management.
If the U.S. is unable to provide that leadership, conflict is
likely with even less possibility for resolving environmental
management problems.
On the U.S. side, every effort should be made to incorporate
the border state and local governments into a comprehensive
planning structure that could assist the IBEC in all possible
ways.
Both federal governments should assist non-state actors in
research and training activities on both sides of the
border.
Every effort should be made by all concerned to encourage
cooperation among government officials, non-state actors
such as university professors, students, and private groups
to provide a common cooperative pattern for the long-range
effort to preserve and protect the environment.
RESUMEN

Debido a la percepci6n mundial y fronteriza que el problema de
contaminaci6n del aire no es critico, ya no aparece que se resultarA en
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un esfuerzo mayor gubernamental para regular recursos del aire. Por
esto, una "superagencia" o una agencia internacional para funciones
especificas no parece ser probable para resolver el manejo de recursos
del aire a lo largo de la frontera U.S.-Mexico en el futuro inmediato.
La participaci6n de las agencias federales es indispensible para
cualquiera resoluci6n subsiguiente de problemas de recursos del aire.
Aunque es necesario que agencias nacionales y locales toman parte
activas, se necesita una agencia internacional o bi-nacional para
resolver los problemas entre los dos paises. Tal agencia es la Comisi6n
Internacional de Limites de Aguas (C.I.L.A.). Se debe extender el
papel de la C.I.L.A. para incluir el manejo supervisorio sobre la
contaminaci6n del aire y agua con el entendimiento que otros asuntos
ambientales tal vez tambi~n estarn bajo la jurisdicci6n de la
Comisi6n. Por esto parece bien cambiar el nombre a la Comisi6n
Internacional de Limites y Ambiente.
Para este papel extendido de la C.I.L.A. se requiere un tratado
formal. Los acuerdos formales deben ser flexibles y abiertos y al
mismo tiempo deben reconocer formalmente al carActer verdaderamente internacional de problemas ambientales. Tambi6n estos
arreglos formales deben reconocer que, en el futuro inmediato,
cooperaci6n probablamente seri al denominador comdn mis
bajo/menos gasto nivel. Pero se deben hacer cada esfuerzo para
asegurar que la C.I.L.A. tiene largos poderes investigativos para hacer
su misi6n de recoger datos. La C.I.L.A. tambi6n debe quedar tanto no
politico como posible debido a la probabilidad del crecimiento de
tensi6n en las regiones fronterizas.
No se debe permitir que las fronteras internacionales sirven como
un vehiculo para que otros gobiernos nacionales y locales pueden
ignorar sus propios responsibilidades, particularmente en los Estados
Unidos. Los Estados Unidos debe reconocer sus obligaciones morales y
legales para limpiar un ambiente contaminado y para presentar un
modelo para los paises del mundo tercero, como relaciona al manejo
ambiental. Si los Estados Unidos no puede proveer tal direcci6n, el
resulto serdi conflicto con menor posibilidad de resolver los problemas
de manejo ambiental.
En el lado de los Estados Unidos necesita incluir los gobiernos de los
estados fronterizos en una estructura de planear que funcionari a
asistir la C.I.L.A. en cualquiera manera posible. Los dos gobiernos
federales deben asistir en actividades de estudiar y disciplinar en
ambos lados de la frontera y todos interesados deben facilitar
cooperaci6n entre oficiales gubernamentales, profesores, estudiantes y
otros grupos para proveer un modelo de cooperaci6n para el esfuerzo
de larga distancia de proteger y preservar el ambiente.

